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1. Introduction 
During the last decade or so, the concept of bureau-
cratic reputation and the derived process of reputation 
management in the public sector have been entering 
from off stage into the field of public administration 
(e.g., Wæraas & Byrkjeflot, 2012; Wæraas & Maor, 
2015). On the cusp of the new millennium, scholars 
were exposed to the basic theoretical foundations for 
the study of bureaucratic reputation and autonomy in 
the shape of a seminal contribution by Dan Carpenter 
(2001). A decade later, another seminal contribution 
followed (Carpenter, 2010a). The bureaucratic reputa-
tion framework that has emerged is comprised of four 
elements: the specific view of reputation which ena-
bles an agency to claim a unique contribution to the 
public good; the multifaceted nature of reputation; the 
existence of multiple expectations by multiple audi-
ences, and the context of today’s knowledge society 
and blame culture which fosters conditions that inten-
sify agency concerns with reputational risk (Maor, 
2015). Agency is used here in its broad sense, that is, 
government authority, rather than in the narrow sense, 
that is, “modern” agency (Bach, Fleischer, & Hustedt, 
2010, p. 13). 
Studies informed by this framework have revealed 
a large set of processes and phenomena. Recent find-
ings have related to the consequences of reputational 
concerns for the way agencies approve some drugs 
more quickly than others (Carpenter, 2002) and allo-
cate resources across tasks (Gilad, 2012). Additional re-
search has dealt with endogenous construction of ju-
risdictions (Maor, 2010) and the observability of 
regulatory decisions and errors (Maor, 2011). Re-
searchers have also examined the duration of en-
forcement decisions (Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2013), 
as well as the changes in an agency’s outputs and the 
mix between its outputs and other activities (Maor & 
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Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2016). Still other studies have 
demonstrated the extent and the ways regulatory 
agencies manage their reputations through the strate-
gic use of communications (Gilad, Maor, & Ben-Nun 
Bloom, 2015; Maor, Gilad, & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013). 
Carpenter (2001, 2010a) has offered some generalized 
answers to issues regarding reputation and power, and 
has summed up the contribution of this scholarly litera-
ture: “The lesson of this scholarship is that, when trying 
to account for a regulator’s behavior, look at the audi-
ence, and look at the threats” (Carpenter, 2010b, p. 
832; italics in original).  
Given these insightful findings, it is rather surprising 
that so little attention has been devoted to the social 
processes by which collective perceptions regarding a 
public agency emerge. At the end of the day, social ap-
proval or disapproval of an agency is based on collec-
tive perceptions. But precisely how do such percep-
tions emerge? What mechanisms are at play 
throughout this process amongst multiple audiences 
who may have dramatically different values and expec-
tations? What forms of communication are embedded 
within different segments of society that facilitate or 
inhibit the transmission of reputation-relevant infor-
mation? Furthermore, under some conditions, traits 
and/or behaviors of individuals within an agency—
especially the agency head—may be linked together in 
the minds of members of the political elites and the 
general public. What people know about an agency 
may parallel what they know of the agency head. Be-
sides, if the agency head is famous by virtue of his past 
achievements, he or she may be deemed worthy of at-
tention. So what is the relationship between an agency 
head’s reputation and agency reputation in a media-
saturated environment? The need to deepen our un-
derstanding of Carpenter’s insights is therefore of ut-
most importance. 
Drawing on robust findings from social networks, 
social cognition and the study of emotion, this article 
offers a set of ideas and a series of predictions on how 
systematic variation in two sets of relationships may 
bear on agency choices. The first is the agency-
audience relationship which revolves around how and 
what individuals, groups and society as a whole think 
about public agencies, how people’s thoughts and con-
cerns impact upon agency behavior, and how infor-
mation regarding this behavior is transformed within 
multiple agencies, and influences audience memory 
and behavior regarding that agency. In other words, 
how does agency response to reputational threats re-
verberate amongst different audiences and feed back 
to the agency’s perception of reputational threats and 
opportunities? The second is the relationship between 
agency head reputation and the reputation of that 
agency. For example, what impact does a newly ap-
pointed agency head with a good or bad reputation 
have on the agency’s behavior and how long is this 
maintained? Understanding these two sets of interac-
tions is fundamental to grasping the process by which 
bureaucratic reputation emerges, assessing the im-
portance of reputation and its role, and understanding 
how to manage it effectively. This paper is therefore 
meant to be expositional and exploratory. The aim is 
not to provide an overall analytical framework but ra-
ther to sketch out the pieces of two missing parts in 
the bureaucratic reputation framework, and to conjec-
ture as to how bureaucratic scholars should empirically 
confront them. Furthermore, the aim is not to elaborate 
the state of the art of bureaucratic reputation theory—a 
task recently undertaken elsewhere (Wæraas & Maor, 
2015), but rather to develop a research agenda which is 
rooted in a political science approach. 
The article identifies six broad areas that offer the 
most promising possibilities for future research on 
bureaucratic reputation: (1) the manipulation of emo-
tions by an agency in order to increase the audience’s 
attention to some reputation-relevant information; 
(2) the variation in audience information processing 
and behavior as derived from the relative importance 
they attach to an agency; (3) the variation in audience 
information processing and behavior as derived from 
cultural attributes; (4) the variation in communication 
strategies undertaken by agency heads who enjoy a 
good reputation compared to those who enjoy a bad 
or indistinct reputation; (5) the variation in the align-
ment of agency heads, who enjoy different levels of 
reputation, with the agency’s main audiences and 
with the agency management, and (6) the variation in 
the agency’s strategies with potential negative conse-
quences which are executed by agency heads who en-
joy a good reputation as compared to those who en-
joy a bad or indistinct reputation. The article calls 
upon researchers to incorporate insights from the lit-
eratures of social networks, social cognition and emo-
tion, to dimensionalize the aforementioned sets of re-
lationships and to assess the generalizability of the 
effects of reputation. 
The article proceeds as follows: the second section 
explores the ideational and definitional grounds, the 
third elaborates on the major premises of bureaucratic 
reputation as an audience-based approach; the fourth 
focuses on the role of the media in the interplay be-
tween agencies and audiences, the fifth elaborates on 
the main premises of agency head reputation and its 
interaction with agency reputation, the sixth discusses 
the link between agency head reputation and agency 
autonomy—a link which is at the heart of the political 
science approach to bureaucratic reputation, and the 
seventh briefly elaborates on the measurement of or-
ganizational reputation as well as the reputation of the 
agency head. The final section concludes. Before delv-
ing into the substance of this article, the next section 
considers early research in bureaucratic reputation and 
the setting up of the definitional ground. 
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2. The Ideational and Definitional Grounds 
Scholars of politics have long been aware of the need 
to look at reputational concerns at the individual and 
organizational levels. According to Goffman (1959), for 
example, many aspects of politics are not only about 
overseeing or giving account but also about advancing 
one’s standing in the eyes of one’s audience and about 
being seen as a reputable actor. This is why “[…] the 
formative years of a policy-making agency are of crucial 
importance in determining its behavior” (Wilson, 1989, 
p. 68). During the formative years, “[a]mong the critical 
decisions facing leadership, closely related to the defi-
nition of mission, is the selection of a clientele, market, 
target, allies, or other segment of the environment to 
which operations will be oriented” (Selznick, 1957, p. 
104). Recognizing the importance of this selection pro-
cess requires a nuanced understanding of the role of 
culture in the environment within which agency oper-
ates. This is because “[i]n order for a reputation to 
have an effect, both sides involved in a transaction 
must ex ante have some idea of the meaning of appro-
priate or equitable fulfillment of the contract” (Kreps, 
1990, p. 93; italics in original). The traditional view is 
that agency culture is insulated from external political 
and social forces. In contrast, the bureaucratic reputa-
tion perspective is premised on the idea that bureau-
cratic culture (read, “internal culture”) influences key 
parameters in an agency’s operation and language 
through agency interaction with institutional actors, 
such as political executives, legislators, advocacy 
groups and political parties—all are operating within a 
particular cultural context (read, “external culture”) 
(Carpenter, 2001, p. 376, fn. 22). This inseparability of 
“internal” and “external” cultures (Kreps, 1990) is 
equally relevant in the relationships between politi-
cians and bureaucrats. Moe (1984), for example, lays 
out in simple terms the role of bureaucrats’ reputation 
as an important mechanism that facilitates the moni-
toring job of politicians over the bureaucracy. Accord-
ing to Moe, “[o]ne [mechanism] is the reputation of 
bureaucrats. Over time, politicians are able to observe 
bureaucratic behavior and, for many of the more im-
portant actors, arrive at tacit agreement as to their 
honesty, competence, ideology, innovativeness, and 
other qualities of relevance” (1984, p. 767).  
Despite how insightful and thought-provoking the 
aforementioned observations were, they did not trig-
ger much research on bureaucratic reputation during 
the 1980s and 1990s, although some political scientists 
did make contributions to this subfield (Heimann, 
1997; Quirk, 1980; Rourke, 1984; Wilson, 1989; Whit-
ford, 2002). However, that has changed since Carpen-
ter (2001) first noticed that agencies attempt to culti-
vate reputation that will enable them to gain 
autonomy, and theorized about it. According to Car-
penter (2010, p. 33), “[r]eputations are composed of 
symbolic beliefs about an organization—its capacities, 
intentions, history, mission—and these images are em-
bedded in a network of multiple audiences.” This defi-
nition, over which there is no disagreement among 
scholars (Maor, 2015, p. 19), centers on the evaluation 
of the organization’s unique character and activities by 
multiple audiences. Reputation uniqueness, according 
to Carpenter (2001, p. 5), refers to the demonstration 
by agencies that they can create solutions (e.g., exper-
tise, efficiency) and provide services (e.g., moral pro-
tection) that no other agency in the polity offers. This 
idea resembles the notion of “distinctive competence” 
labeled by Philip Selznick (1957) who claimed that it is 
the role of organization leaders to advance and protect 
such competencies and the resources underlying them. 
This implies that bureaucratic reputation relies on the 
external audiences’ perceptions of the quality of agen-
cy outcomes that these audiences really care about, 
and the effectiveness of its actions, which distinguish 
the agency from others in the polity.  
3. Bureaucratic Reputation as an Audience-Based 
Approach 
In this section, we offer relevant observations regard-
ing agency-audience relationships when social network 
and social cognition perspectives are taken into ac-
count. A convenient starting point is the premise that 
audiences observe public agencies. When they do so, 
they bring into play a variety of factors including prior 
knowledge, goals, mental frames, heuristics, distrac-
tion, motivation, emotion, and others. Ultimately, is-
sues arise concerning what the audience will remem-
ber about the agency, what information regarding the 
agency will be suppressed (e.g., Najmi, 2013), and how 
information that audiences rely upon in shaping their 
attitudes contributes to their judgment regarding the 
agency. But audience descriptions and perceptions of 
bureaucratic agencies are remarkably diverse and may 
change over time. This diversity arises because audi-
ence perceptions are not about physically objective re-
ality. What they “see” in agencies is largely inferred, 
assumed and/or felt, and may vary across time, cul-
ture, and subculture (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). 
Taking into account the “social” and the “psychologi-
cal” requires delving into the audiences’ histories, key 
personalities, relationships, motivations, goals, inten-
tions, and plans. Together with various aspects of the 
audience’s social environment, these factors converge to 
shape the communication and interaction between au-
dience members, and the processes by which they come 
to understand social reality (e.g., attribution and attitude 
formation). Audiences strive to make sense of agency 
actions by wondering about their causes, and vice-versa. 
They may do this directly, or by relying on institutional 
intermediaries, such as the media and various special-
ized organizations, or other agencies or audiences.  
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Of greatest relevance is the fact that the interpreta-
tion of information is context dependent because be-
ing socialized in a given context implies acquiring cul-
tural, behavioral and other assumptions. These 
contextual factors prioritize different motivations and 
preferences which lead to different ways of perceiving 
reality. For example, Western cultures revolve around 
individualistic values, emphasizing the needs of the self 
over others (e.g., Greenwald, 1980). This, in turn, may 
produce a focused attentional strategy (Balcetis & Cole, 
2013). Asian cultures, on the other hand, are consid-
ered collectivist, given their emphasis on group happi-
ness and the happiness of significant others over the 
needs of the self (Balcetis & Cole, 2013). Collectivist 
cultures may cause attention to be dispersed among 
different objects (e.g., Duffy & Kitayama, 2010). Differ-
ent ways of perceiving reality imply different reputa-
tional threats and opportunities derived from different 
audiences. Cultural factors may therefore contribute 
toward an explanation of the ways agencies prioritize 
different audiences over time and the ways audiences 
prioritize different agencies over time.  
The aforementioned processes also result in infor-
mation communicated to the agency whose outcomes 
affect whether those involved will interact again, under 
what circumstances and for what purposes; whether 
they will influence or affect each other in other ways, 
even in absentia; or whether the whole interaction will 
be remembered or will lead to enduring changes in 
their attitudes, intentions and expectations. Audiences 
may expect different things from different agencies 
over time, and so the same agency behavior may pro-
duce different reputational consequences for different 
agencies. Audiences may also have conflicting expecta-
tions from some agencies, and complementary expec-
tations from others. And some audiences’ expectations 
may be more prominent, and more consequential than 
others. In addition, information about public agencies 
may be processed differently than information about 
individuals and groups. The key point here is that agen-
cies may have specific relationships with particular au-
diences in particular time periods. Another point is that 
many aspects of the interrelationships between agen-
cies and audiences might be better understood in 
terms of what we know about social networks, social 
cognition and affective experiences (e.g., moods, emo-
tions)—both as constraints and as targets for instru-
mental manipulation—which are fairly distant from bu-
reaucratic politics. 
How do theories of emotion and affect bear on 
theories of bureaucratic reputation? Emotion generally 
refers to particular feelings (e.g., sadness, anger) that 
are “intense, short-lived, and usually have a definite 
cause and clear cognitive content” (Forgas, 1992, p. 
230). Affect, according to Finucane, Peters, & Slovic 
(2003, p. 328), refers to “‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ (1) 
experienced as a feeling state […] (2) demarcating a 
positive or negative quality of a specific stimulus […]”. 
Emotion and affect influence behavior in two distinct 
ways. First, people anticipate and factor in their likely 
feelings about the potential consequences of different 
modes of agency actions. Second, people may be influ-
enced by immediate emotions experienced at the mo-
ment of choice (e.g., Rick & Loewenstein, 2010) among 
bureaucratic agencies and at the moment of choice 
among the public goods they produce.  
Two interrelated streams of research—one con-
cerns affect (i.e., good/bad feelings) which is repre-
sented by the affect heuristic, and another concerns af-
fect-as-information—provide ample evidence of the 
impact affect and emotion have on subjective probabil-
ities, value, and risk-benefit balance (for a review, see 
Finucane, 2013). The affect heuristic refers to people’s 
tendency to base their judgment (e.g., of a public 
product, agency, or policy) on what they think and feel 
about it (e.g., Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 
2000, p. 5). “If they feel good about [it], they tend to 
judge risks as low and benefits as high; if they feel bad 
about it, they may judge the opposite […]” (Peters, 
2011, p. 90). The affect-as-information literature “as-
serts that affective reactions serve as information 
about what one likes or dislikes” (Clore & Palmer, 
2009, p. 22). According to this line of thought, Zajonc 
(1980, 1984), Bargh (1984) and LeDoux (1996) have 
demonstrated that affective reactions to stimuli are 
faster than cognitive evaluation, and therefore provide 
a crude assessment of the behavioral options people 
face. Recently, Lodge and Taber (2013) found that “[…] 
all thinking is suffused with feeling, and these feelings 
arise automatically within a few milliseconds […] of ex-
posure to a sociopolitical object or event” (p. 19). The 
affect heuristic combined with Lodge and Taber’s 
(2013) findings imply that agencies operating in rela-
tively high emotional domains, such as those concern-
ing life and death (e.g., the U.S. Food and Drug Admin-
istration, the European Medicines Agency and the 
European Food Safety Authority) may face a relatively 
high level of emotion-based audience reactions com-
pared to agencies operating within relatively neutral 
domains (e.g., Groenleer, 2014). In other words, an 
agency has to factor in the possibility that audiences 
with different emotional attributes and at different 
emotional states may respond differently to different 
types of news concerning the agency.  
Further, an agency may attempt to influence which 
emotions its audiences have, when they have them, 
and how they experience and express these emotions 
(Maor & Gross, 2015). At the same time, an agency 
may be exposed to attempts undertaken by emotional 
entrepreneurs (Maor & Gross, 2015) to influence audi-
ences’ emotions towards the agency. In addition, be-
cause agency tasks are multi-dimensional, agencies 
operating in emotional domains can be criticized for 
technical tasks, which are not emotionally laden, while 
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agencies working on more neutral domains can be crit-
icized on moral aspects of their reputation, which are 
more emotionally laden. In essence, this calls for stud-
ies that take into account the emotions attached to the 
domain in which the agency operates, contingent on 
the specific dimension (i.e., performative, technical, 
procedural and moral) that is challenged with related 
task characteristics and on the emotional entrepre-
neurs that operate in the policy domain. 
But how do audiences prioritize different expecta-
tions over time? Specifically, how independent are the 
dimensions by which audiences evaluate agencies? Do 
these dimensions reflect the real, underlying behavior 
of public agencies, or merely audiences’ perceptions 
about agency characteristics? And how independent 
are the dimensions by which agencies evaluate audi-
ences? Carpenter (2010) has directed attention to-
wards key dimensions, be they performative, moral, 
procedural, and technical traits of the organization. An 
agency does not have a strong reputation per se, but 
rather a strong reputation for the protection of public 
safety, public health, public morality and so on. Car-
penter’s four faces of an agency’s reputation highlight 
the dimensions over which the relative standing of the 
organization is assessed vis-à-vis other agencies. Car-
penter’s statement also implies the existence of multi-
ple reputations—and therefore, multiple expectations 
by external audiences regarding each of these dimen-
sions. Each external audience selects the dimension/s 
of reputation which will receive priority in its assess-
ment of the organization. But do audience perceptions 
vary along Carpenter’s (2001) four dimensions of com-
petence? When audiences undertake comparative 
judgments of agencies, do these dimensions have a 
compensatory relationship so that, for example, learn-
ing that an agency is high on the performative trait 
lowers estimates of morality (e.g., in the case of an 
agency in charge of deporting illegal immigrants)? In 
other words, do some audiences tend to differentiate 
dimensions of agency reputation in a comparative con-
text in a compensatory direction? These questions 
should be central to our subfield but are not. 
4. Agencies, Audiences, and the Role of the Media 
As an audience-based approach, the bureaucratic repu-
tation framework seriously takes media coverage on 
board. Recent studies have already demonstrated the 
extent and the ways regulatory agencies manage their 
reputations through the strategic use of communica-
tions (e.g., Gilad, Maor, & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015; Maor, 
Gilad, & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013). Agencies also build 
reputation by shadowing practices and policies pur-
sued by agencies that possess good reputations (Maor, 
2007, 2011); by affiliating with established players and 
by appointing top management teams who enjoy good 
reputations (Petkova, 2012). 
When an agency is first encountered, an audience 
starts by categorizing the agency based on salient fea-
tures of characteristics and behaviors. When an audi-
ence is first encountered, agencies start by doing the 
same thing. Although media coverage can serve to bias 
the perceptions of both agencies and audiences, they 
can also attune perceivers to each other’s actions, eval-
uations and behavior. Thus, media coverage can bias 
perceivers and make them more sensitive to certain sig-
nals, and moderate the accuracy with which agency be-
havior is recognized. Specific agency behavior can also 
attune audiences to functionally important actions and 
other signals. These signals can mobilize perceivers’ cog-
nitive and perceptional resources in preparation for ac-
tion. Thus, certain signals may be capable of attuning 
perceivers to relevant agency behavior.  
Agency characteristics and behavior may place it in 
certain categories in audiences’ perception. These ef-
fects may be ramified throughout subsequent stages of 
information processes. Furthermore, what an audience 
perceives may be due, in part, to what it expects to 
see—its expectation and belief regarding the agency. 
Although these perceptions and thoughts are influ-
enced by media coverage, they are also motivated 
phenomena—audiences may work harder to extract 
(accurate) information regarding certain agencies rela-
tive to others. Audiences may also be better at encod-
ing and remembering information regarding agencies 
whose operations are important to them, relative to 
others. For example, decisions by the U.S. Environment 
Protection Agency may be more important to envi-
ronmental policy interest groups than to education pol-
icy interest groups. This tendency of audiences to read-
ily think about public agencies which are important to 
them is not a point of debate. The question is not 
whether agency characteristics and behaviors are im-
portant in reputation formation but rather when they 
are more likely to be influential in the interpretation of 
structurally and situationally invariant information.  
The discussion on agency audiences leads to the 
following propositions: 
(i) When faced with negative media coverage, an 
agency will tend to manipulate emotions in 
order to ensure that its audiences selectively 
attend to some types of information regarding 
the agency while ignoring others. 
(ii) An agency’s perception of each of its audiences 
will determine what information is generated 
for consumption by each audience, how that 
information is generated, how the feedback is 
evaluated, and what inferences are drawn from 
it. 
(iii) Audiences will more quickly process differences 
between past and present agency behavior for 
agencies whose operations are important to 
them. 
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(iv) Audiences will more quickly infer agency 
characteristics from the behavior of agencies 
whose operations are important to them. 
(v) Audiences may be better at encoding and 
remembering information regarding agencies 
whose operations are important to them. 
5. Agency Head’s Reputation 
Although many bureaucracy scholars emphasize the 
importance of agency heads (Aberbach & Rockman, 
2000; Adolph, 2013; Busuioc & Groenleer, 2012; Car-
penter & Krause, 2012; Kaufman, 1981; Seidman & 
Gilmour, 1998; Wilson, 1989), scholars of organization-
al reputation tend to ignore the reputation of the sin-
gle leader at the top of an agency’s hierarchy in their 
explanations of agency behavior. Agency head here re-
fers to an individual who is statutorily authorized to 
make legally binding decisions on behalf of an agency. 
The agency head’s reputation can be conceptualized 
along Carpenter’s (2001) coordinates as a set of beliefs 
about an agency head’s individual capacities, values 
and intentions that are embedded in audience net-
works.  
The tendency to ignore the reputation of agency 
heads may lie in the similarity between the factors that 
influence agency head’s reputation and those that in-
fluence organizational reputation, or in the methodo-
logical obstacles that hamper the ability of scholars to 
differentiate between these two constructs in normal 
practice. This neglect may be justified as long as one 
assumes that agency-head reputation moves in tan-
dem with organizational reputation, and that agency 
heads’ incentives are fully aligned with those of their 
organizations. This assumption is sensible insofar as 
audiences’ assessments of agency heads affect organi-
zational reputation and vice versa. However, there are 
a number of key differences between these two con-
structs, namely, the shorter horizon over which the 
agency head can build his or her reputation compared 
to an agency that has been doing it for decades; the 
relative instability of the agency head reputation when 
new information is revealed relative to organizational 
reputation which has been developed over multiple 
decades, and the portability of the agency head’s dis-
tinct reputation (Graffin, Pfarrer, & Hill, 2012). Fur-
thermore, there are certain times at which these two 
constructs may move in separate directions—for ex-
ample, when a change in agency head leads to agency 
reputation and agency head reputation to converge 
around the average level of reputation. These differ-
ences raise a question which to the best of my 
knowledge has never been examined: What impact 
does a newly appointed agency head with a good/bad 
reputation have on agency behavior and how long is it 
maintained?  
6. Bureaucratic Autonomy and Agency Head’s 
Reputation 
Bureaucratic reputation has been considered a key fac-
tor in determining agency autonomy. Autonomy pre-
vails, according to Carpenter (2001, p. 4), when agen-
cies can establish a reputation and persuade political 
executives to defer to agency wishes. “Under these 
conditions, politicians grant agency officials free rein in 
program building” (Carpenter 2001, p. 4). Given that 
the same factors that contribute to agency autonomy 
may differentiate among agency heads, it is rather sur-
prising that agency autonomy has become a well-
charted territory, but less so, the variance amongst 
agency heads. Take, for example, professionalism (We-
ber, 1946; Wilson, 1989). According to Wilson, “[i]n a 
bureaucracy, professionals are those employed who 
receive some significant portion of their incentives 
from organized groups of fellow practitioners located 
outside the agency” (1989, p. 60). However, Wilson 
does not consider the possibility that there are profes-
sionals in administrative agencies who enjoy worldwide 
esteem (e.g., FDA Medical Officer Frances Kelsey who 
reviewed the thalidomide case), others that enjoy good 
reputation in the geographical region or in the relevant 
territory, and others who enjoy bad or indistinct repu-
tation. Other factors contributing to agency autonomy 
and thereby to the differentiation among agency heads 
are the cultivation of external audiences (Carpenter, 
2001, 2010) and the management of audiences’ conflict-
ing views and assessment criteria in light of the agency’s 
understanding of its distinct multidimensional reputa-
tion (Gilad, Maor, & Ben-Nun Bloom, 2015; Maor, Gilad, 
& Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013); the pursuit by agencies of 
“strategic neutrality”, i.e., when agencies act politically 
in a way that does not unite opponents (Huber, 2007); 
the presence of multiple competing principals (Ham-
mond & Knott, 1996), and the inattention by elected of-
ficials who operate alongside well-informed bureaucrats 
(Calvert, McCubbins, & Weingast, 1989). 
Agency heads may also vary in their ability to strike 
political bargains at the national or federal levels and 
adhere to these bargains by imposing systematic and 
uniform local enforcement policies. They may also vary 
in their ability to pit one principal against another 
(Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991), manipulate principal-
agent relationships (Riker, 1986) and manage informal 
compliance and resistance mechanisms in bureaucratic 
politics (Carpenter & Krause, 2015). Some agency 
heads may be well-informed relative to other agency 
heads and possess the necessary skills to transfer in-
formation into knowledge (i.e., “connect the dots”). 
Some agency heads may be loyal to the president who 
picked them (Krause & O’Connell, 2015), and some 
may fit the political environment of bureaucracy inso-
far their ideology is concerned (Bertelli & Grose, 2009, 
2011; Clinton, Bartelli, Grose, Lewis, & Nixon, 2012; 
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Nixon, 2004). Agency heads may also vary in their ca-
reer concerns (Adolph, 2013; Alesina & Tabellini, 2007; 
Dewatripont, Jewitt, & Tirole, 1999) and in their level 
of care about their organizational identity, especially in 
terms of their preferences for cooperation or for team 
spirit when they serve an assigned role and function 
within the organization (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005; 
March & Simon, 1992). 
The aforementioned variance in agency heads’ abil-
ity, ideology and care of organizational identity may 
lead to variability in their reputations as well as in their 
concerns about the risks and opportunities associated 
with their future reputation (and compensation). In 
addition, different audiences may be differently affect-
ed by the aforementioned traits. This, in turn, calls for 
a more in-depth analysis of the mediating role of audi-
ences in shaping agency heads’ reputation, and there-
by, the variability in agency heads’ reputations. Given 
that bureaucratic agencies have, to a greater extent, 
become mediatized, the same goes for the head of the 
communications department who handles the actual 
day-to-day processes of reputation management.  
In the modern-world media environment, reputa-
tional concerns of agency heads may extend beyond 
the internal games agency heads play to manipulate 
principals’ inferences regarding their ability, ideology 
and so on. At the outset, the social construction of 
leadership images involves, among others, the belief 
that individuals determine the fate of organizations 
(Chen & Meindl, 1991, p. 524). When this belief bears 
on the popular press and its readership, the risk man-
agement agenda of an agency head expands. Further, 
in the modern information environment, all major poli-
cy decisions made by agency heads are observed, and 
so are all relevant agency outcomes. In addition, na-
tional and international league tables, which provide 
quality metrics for agency and agency head reputation, 
are “[…] perceived and articulated as a source of repu-
tational risk” (Power, Scheytt, Soin, & Sahlin, 2009, p. 
302). However, the media still seeks interpretations of 
these decisions and outcomes. Negative commentary 
by informed or expert third parties, such as the busi-
ness press (e.g., Zuckerman, 1999), may tilt the proba-
bilities towards opinions that are reputationally less fa-
vorable for agency heads. Consequently, some agency 
heads may enter the fray by adopting various presenta-
tional strategies (Hood, 2011) in an attempt to explain 
their objectives, methods and decisions. Others will do 
so on a smaller scale, and some may even consider 
keeping silent (Maor, forthcoming). Whether to inter-
vene in the media environment, and if so, how “loud” 
should one do it, may be directly related to an agency 
head’s reputation. This, in turn, is most likely to be 
manifested when an agency encounters shocks in the 
form of agency head succession and following an un-
expected positive or negative event (Graffin et al., 
2012). In both cases agency reputation and agency 
head reputation are likely to be distinct. In the former 
case, this is due to the early stages in the agency head’s 
tenure, in the second, the relatively high visibility of 
agency policy and the agency head’s presentation of this 
policy. Questions related to these interrelationships and 
the derived reputational mechanisms at work should 
come to the fore in the area of bureaucratic reputation.  
The discussion of an agency head’s reputation rais-
es the following propositions: 
(i) Agency heads with a bad or indistinct reputation 
might fight hard to build a positive reputation, 
and thus respond vigorously and “loudly” to any 
hint of criticism in all of the above cases. By 
contrast, an agency head who enjoys a good 
reputation is more likely to talk less when facing 
criticism. In addition, an agency head with a bad 
or indistinct reputation is expected to be more 
inclined to respond to public judgments, 
especially during his or her early tenure and 
shortly before the end of tenure.  
(ii) Agency heads with a bad or indistinct reputation 
are more likely to be aligned with the agency’s 
main audiences rather than with the agency 
management. By contrast, agency heads with a 
good reputation are more likely to be aligned 
with the agency management rather than the 
agency’s main audiences.  
(iii) Agency heads with a bad or indistinct reputation 
are more likely to be concerned with both the 
level and variability of their reputation when 
compared to agency heads who enjoy a good 
reputation. 
(iv) Agency heads at the early stages of their career 
will be less likely to engage in activities which 
have potentially negative consequences when 
compared to agency heads who enjoy a good 
reputation. 
(v) Agency heads who enjoy a good reputation will 
tend to increase transparency especially 
regarding their active, bolder policy activities 
when compared to agency heads with a bad or 
indistinct reputation. 
(vi) When agency heads enjoy a good/bad 
reputation, the level of agency reputation will 
converge towards the level of the agency head’s 
reputation. 
7. Measurement  
None of the current bureaucratic reputation scholars 
measure reputation per se, but rather reputational 
threats as manifested in the media. There is however a 
literature that compares citizen’s perceptions of agen-
cy performance relative to their expectations and con-
siders the impact of widely disseminated agency per-
formance information on citizen perceptions (e.g., 
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Jacobsen, Snyder, & Saultz, 2014; Lavertu, 2015). There 
are also studies that consider the ideological reputa-
tion of U.S. agencies, applying measurement models to 
synthesize the perceived reputation of agencies among 
experts (e.g., Clinton & Lewis, 2008). Organizational 
theory scholars have also wrestled with the measure-
ment of reputation, with some applying an overall 
measure while others apply an attribute-specific meas-
ure (Dowling & Gardberg, 2012). For example, 
Fombrun (2012) defines firm reputation as a collective 
assessment of a company’s attractiveness to a specific 
group of stakeholders relative to a reference group 
with which the company competes for resources. This 
conception, therefore, implies an overall measure of 
“attractiveness”. At the same time, reputation varies 
across audiences and attributes because it is directed 
toward specific stakeholders. As a result, firms can 
have multiple reputations (Greenwood, Parkish, & 
Deephouse, 2005; Jensen & Roy, 2008). Reputation ad-
ditionally accounts for past behavior and/or perfor-
mance (Jensen & Roy, 2008; Washington & Zajac, 
2005). Because of these characteristics, Jensen, Kim 
and Kim (2012) make the case that a firm’s reputation 
should be attribute-specific rather than an overall as-
sessment. Scholars of bureaucratic reputation should 
note that much of the reputation literature in organiza-
tional studies is moving in this direction. At the same 
time, there are numerous indicators of a firm’s reputa-
tion that are not available to scholars of bureaucratic 
reputation, such as share prices and the existence of 
long-term, global and local, consumer-based reputa-
tional rankings. Thus, there still remains a scope for 
gaining interesting insights regarding bureaucratic 
agencies by using the overall measure.  
Regarding the measurability of agency head reputa-
tions, drawing on the methodological insights of stud-
ies of corporate reputation (Graffin et al., 2012; Mil-
bourn, 2003), one may focus on five indicators which 
capture the variance in agency head reputation within 
a defined period, namely, agency head experience—
operationalized in terms of their last-post tenure; 
background—whether the agency head was hired from 
inside or outside the agency; performance in their last 
post—operationalized in financial and organizational 
terms; CEO awards, and media salience—a count of 
press articles that mention the agency head’s name.  
8. Conclusions 
Reputation approach to bureaucratic organizations 
embraces a large set of processes and phenomena 
(e.g., Busuioc & Lodge, 2015; Maor, 2015). However, it 
is challenged here as lacking in crucial components, 
namely, agency-audience interrelationships, and the 
relationships between agency head reputation and 
agency reputation. The prototypical scenarios arguably 
involve an agency which encounters a reputational 
threat and then reacts in order to protect its reputa-
tion. But missing is the perceiver of agency actions who 
encounters or learns about the agency’s (and the agen-
cy head’s) efforts to protect and enhance its reputa-
tion, the ways he/she refines an impression, and 
thereafter, the various thoughts and memories which 
subsequently shape his or her behavior regarding the 
agency (and the agency head). Missing also is the rich-
ness of the multiple transformation of the information 
communicated by the agency to a given audience. Fur-
ther, the way agency response to reputational threats 
reverberates amongst different audiences (6, 2014) 
may impact on the relationship between agency head 
reputation and the reputation of that agency. This is 
because culture underlies an agency’s reputation with 
its employees and clients, and “the violation of the cul-
ture will generate direct negative externalities insofar 
as it weakens the organization’s overall reputation” 
(Kreps, 1990, p. 126). So far, the literature on bureau-
cratic reputation has not delved into these issues, but 
an interesting research agenda awaits those answering 
this article’s call for action. 
But why should scholars of bureaucratic politics 
bother to develop reputational theories beyond Car-
penter? According to Maor (2015), Carpenter puts too 
much emphasis on the exogenous threats to agency 
reputation while underestimating their endogenous 
processing, given agencies’ understanding of their dis-
tinct reputations. The agency-audience relationships as 
well as the relationships between agency head reputa-
tion and agency reputation may play a key role in the 
intra-agency process of interpreting and acting upon 
reputation information. This role is currently an un-
charted territory. In addition, Carpenter too greatly 
emphasizes the institutional persistence of legislative 
and presidential decisions which lend stability to bu-
reaucratic autonomy, thereby lending stability to good 
reputation. But institutional persistence cannot be 
guaranteed, as indicated, for example, by Lewis’s 
(2002) finding that 62% of U.S. agencies created be-
tween 1946 and 1997 have been terminated and that 
political turnover is one of the primary causes of ter-
mination. Assuming that agencies recognize the possi-
bility of termination following, for example, a significant 
operational failure, it is reasonable to expect that repu-
tation information will be seriously looked at and acted 
upon. The agency-audience relationships as well as the 
relationships between agency head reputation and 
agency reputation may play a key role in this process. 
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